From time to time, I like to read the full text of a legislative bill, if only to put my past work experience at the White House and my law degree to some good use. What caught my attention recently was the RESTRICT Act, which goes after the national security implications of Chinese technologies in the US. It is getting lots of traction in DC, so I read it – all 55-pages of it.

My one-sentence conclusion: if it becomes law, the RESTRICT Act basically spells “game over” for all Chinese technology companies seeking to do business in the US.

RESTRICT stands for Restricting the Emergence of Security Threats that Risk Information and Communications Technology. (Never underestimate how much energy Congressional staffers put into a catchy acronym to help pass a bill.) It covers all the potential dangers posed by technologies affiliated with America’s foreign adversaries – namely, the PRC (including Hong Kong and Macau), Russia, North Korea, Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela under Maduro. But everyone knows the bill is squarely aimed at China and, to a much lesser extent, Russia. (No one is concerned about the threat of networking equipment made in Iran or Cuba.)

What’s surprising to me is how extremely comprehensive the technology areas that are covered under this proposal, and how much power this bill gives the executive branch to ban (or restrict) these technologies for national security purposes.

Extremely Comprehensive

Section 5 of the bill outlines in great detail the types of technologies that are considered priorities to scrutinize. The list is long and covers essentially every type of technical product or service under the sun, so it really does not provide much “prioritization.” Everything is on the table and potentially problematic.

Some of the areas are to be expected: networking equipment, satellites, drones. Some of the areas are of obvious strategic value for both the US and China, so also expected: AI, quantum computing, biotech. But some areas that are quite innocuous, generic, and not strategic in nature are also included: e-commerce, CDNs, cloud-based SaaS products. Even open source software, which by definition is not “owned” by any company, let alone any country, is on the list.


The threshold that triggers scrutiny is also very low. For hardware, it is 1,000,000 units sold in the U.S. For software applications or services, it is 1,000,000 annual active users (not monthly or daily) who are located in the US (do not have to be US citizens). These thresholds are laid out in Section 2.


Like I said in the beginning, if passed, the RESTRICT will restrict the business operation of Chinese technology companies of almost any size in any industry.

Expansion of Executive Power

The scope of the RESTRICT Act goes well beyond banning TikTok or sanctioning Huawei. By providing an extremely broad and fairly loose framework, the bill empowers the President and the executive branch (specifically the Department of Commerce) to act swiftly with legal empowerment from Congress, which avoids the embarrassment of Trump’s previous attempt to ban TikTok and WeChat.

Quick flash back: two federal judges struck down Trump’s attempted ban in 2020, because his invocation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act was deemed to have overstepped the power granted to the President. If the RESTRICT Act or something similar were law during the Trump administration, his ban likely would not have been struck down by the judicial branch. That’s likely why the Biden administration has not pursued a similar strategy and opted to negotiate with TikTok. That’s perhaps also why the Biden White House enthusiastically endorsed the RESTRICT Act the day it was announced. Banning is certainly easier than negotiating, and few have said “no” to getting more power.

Stepping back, the RESTRICT Act could be the largest expansion of executive power in the name of national security since the USA PATRIOT Act (also a pretty nifty name in legislative-acronym-making). In fact, the bill is directly built on the Patriot Act’s definition of what constitutes “critical infrastructure.”


Just like fighting global terrorism in 2001 after 9/11, there is no issue that enjoys more bipartisan support than fighting the China threat in 2023.

So What’s Next?

It is highly likely that the RESTRICT Act will become law sometime this year. The bill was introduced with bipartisan support by Senators Mark Warner and John Thune. Perennial bellwether swing vote, Senator Joe Manchin, also enthusiastically supports the bill. The White House, in its statement, voiced its unequivocal support and “urge Congress to act quickly to send it to the President’s desk.” Its passage is a question of when, not if, in my view.

Surely, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) opposes this bill on First Amendment grounds, much in the same way that it opposed the Patriot Act. There is also a competing version proposed by the House, called the DATA Act (Deterring America’s Technological Adversaries Act – a more mediocre legislative acronym), so there may be some delay and haggling between the Senate and the House. But given that the China threat narrative is reaching a feverish pitch in DC, the bill would not be watered down and only become tougher, as if there’s any room to be more tough.

This is a harsh reality that Chinese technology companies of all sizes must now face, many of whom have benign and purely business intentions in their pursuit to enter the US market. It is theoretically possible that the RESTRICT Act, after passage, could: 1. Get challenged in court again; 2. Be poorly enforced by the Department of Commerce. But hoping that one of these two scenarios happens is not something to bank on.

Hope is not a strategy.

For founders and entrepreneurs, it's time to start recognizing this reality and plan your overseas market expansion activities elsewhere. There are plenty of opportunities still, albeit less profitable ones, in Southeast Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and corners of the EU.

For VCs who invested in Chinese tech startups at rich valuations on the assumption that the US market is up for grabs, it's time to do an honest markdown of those deals and adjust expectations accordingly.

And while you make these adjustments, perhaps make some donations to the ACLU, as a Hail Mary.


我时不时喜欢读一读一项法案的全文,哪怕只是为了用用我在白宫的工作经验和法学学位。最近引起我关注的是刚从美国参议员出炉的RESTRICT Act,该法案针对中国科技在美国的国家安全影响。它在华府特区已经备受关注,所以我把整套法案的55页都扎扎实实的读了一遍。

如果用一句话总结,那就是:如果通过,成为法律,RESTRICT基本上意味着 “游戏结束” game over 对所有在美国寻求开展业务的中国科技公司。

RESTRICT这个名字是个缩写,意义是“限制出现威胁信息和通信技术安全风险的安全威胁”(Restricting the Emergence of Security Threats that Risk Information and Communications Technology)。(永远不要低估美国国会工作人员为了通过一套法案而投入多少精力编出一个吸引眼球的缩写作为提议名称。)它包括目前所有美国视为“敌对”因此其技术会带来潜在国家安全威胁的国家,即中国(也包括香港和澳门)、俄罗斯、朝鲜、伊朗、古巴和马杜罗领导下的委内瑞拉。但是众所周知,这项法案主要针对中国,其次是俄罗斯。(没有人担心伊朗或古巴制造的网络设备会带来什么威胁。)



法案中第五章详细概述了被认为是需要被优先审查的科技类别。这个清单很长,基本上涵盖了所有可以想象的技术产品和服务,因此它实际上没有提供太多的“优先级” – 所有科技都可能带来国家安全问题。









从更广的层面来看,RESTRICT法案可能是自美国爱国者法案(Patriot Act)以来,以国家安全之名对行政权力的最大一次扩张。更何况该法案还直接引用了爱国者法案对“关键基础设施”一词的法律定义。






这是无论大小,所有规模的中国科技公司现在必须面对的严酷现实,其中许多公司进入美国市场也就是为了纯粹的商业目的。当然从理论上讲,在RESTRICT法案通过后,还是有可能:1. 再次被告上法庭;2. 商务部具体落实执行无力。但是仅期望这两种可能中的一种发生并不是靠谱的方案。




在做这些调整的同时,也许也可以适当给ACLU捐点钱,作为最后一搏的Hail Mary。