This issue covers the period between October 12 - 18, 2020 with six news stories – three from English language sources, three from Chinese language sources. Disclaimer: all translated article titles are done by me, not official translations from the media outlets.
Before you go on, please check out last week's deep dive post: "China's Cloud Ceiling"
“A Senate committee wants to subpoena the tech CEOs over that New York Post story” (English Source: Protocol)
My Thoughts: The drama over how a New York Post story on Hunter Biden (Vice President Joe Biden’s son) was treated on Facebook and Twitter was big news last week. I won’t regurgitate what happened; there are better places on the Internet to go if you need to get caught up. I’m highlighting this impending Senate subpoena, led by three Republican Senators (Rubio, Graham, Hawley) of Zuckerberg and Dorsey, because it will be an important one to watch, arguably more important than the antitrust bonanza that featured Bezos, Cook, Pichai, and (again) Zuckerberg. While antitrust deals with the economic impact of tech, how to regulate tech companies’ proper role in moderating speech, expression, and information has a far-reaching impact on culture, democracy, and how a society should function. Needless to say Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, where most social media companies harbor themselves safely, needs to be updated; the big question is how. As I’ve discussed a few months ago in “Algorithm is the Problem, Not Mark Zuckerberg”:
“While we aim our anger, frustration, and blame at these CEOs, the algorithms that fuel their social networks -- imbued with the features engineered by human beings with their own intentions, emotions, and biases -- have become far more powerful and well beyond their control. But these algorithms are faceless, opaque, and harder to reason about, thus harder for us to blame.”
Any updated regulation will have to grasp the algorithmic nature of both content recommendation and content moderation.
“This 2020 Apple iPhone may be assembled in India” (English Source: Times of India)
My Thoughts: The unveiling of iPhone 12 was the other big tech news last week. While the focus on these announcements usually center on new features and capabilities, where this phone will be manufactured could be the bigger long-term story. The conversation around “decoupling” from China’s manufacturing base has been going on for quite some time, intensified by the coronavirus pandemic. I was initially skeptical of how quickly this “decoupling” will occur, especially with regard to Apple, which I wrote about in “Is Leaving the China Supply Chain a Pipe Dream?”. Now, it looks like all of Apple’s major manufacturers -- Foxconn, Wistron -- are building factories to assemble more and more portions of the iPhone in India. To be clear, Apple’s desire to diversify the geography of its supply chain began a few years ago -- Wistron has been assembling low-end iPhones since 2017. But India’s manufacturing quality wasn’t good enough to make the latest models; perhaps that has changed. There’s also the simple business imperative to sell more iPhones. Non-iPhone smartphones have a 90% market share in India. India also has restrictions on selling smartphones that aren’t made domestically. That’s why lower-end smartphones from Samsung and Xiaomi already have a manufacturing base in India. To sell more iPhones in India, Apple needs to make more iPhones in India. Period. We shouldn’t over-apply geopolitics to explain everything.
“Huawei in talks to sell parts of its Honor smartphone business” (English Source: Reuters)
My Thoughts: This revelation by Reuters was a bit surprising to me, because Huawei’s Honor phone is its cheaper product line with lower margin but also lower performance requirements. If US sanctions are the reason for this possible sale, I would have imagined Huawei’s higher-end line -- Mate -- would be the one to go, because it’s much harder to buy the type of chips needed to power Mate than Honor. One possible explanation: Huawei is trying to keep Mate alive and competitive by consolidating its internal resources and R&D focus. The leading suitor of this sale, Digital China, is also surprising, because it’s a big Huawei’s product distributor, not a competing brand, like Xiaomi or Oppo, though they are part of the sale discussion as well. (More on Digital China below)
“Honor’s sale mystery: Digital China to participate in the takeover as distributor and brands save themselves?” (Chinese Source: Tencent Tech News)
My thoughts: Besides being skeptical of Honor’s sale, chalking it up as more rumor than real, this article summarized the long history of Chinese tech product distributors, like Digital China, to explain why a distributor would want to buy a brand like Honor. These distributors first got started helping foreign brands sell into China, like the gigantic Motorola cell phone. Then China’s domestic brands, which blossomed in 1998 when the government issued a policy to accelerate telecom advancement, came on the scene. The distributor’s relevance has been eroding in the last 10 years, and a big reason was Xiaomi’s innovative distribution model of going direct-to-consumer, e-commerce style, to sell its smartphones. Fast forward to today, Digital China, who was an OG in the distributor space and a public company listed in Shenzhen, is looking for ways to reinvent itself. Given Huawei’s current weakness and existing strong business relationship (Digital China also distributes Huawei Cloud), perhaps both selling and owning Honor doesn’t seem like such a strange idea after all. (For those readers who read Chinese, there are also a few fun puns in this article. I love puns!)
“Top lithography machines sell for nearly 1.2 billion RMB! Chinese companies can only buy a different type.” (Chinese Source: China Securities Journal)
My thoughts: The Dutch company, ASML, is the market leader in lithography equipment -- a crucial element in advanced semiconductor manufacturing. Based on this article’s digging of ASML’s latest earning call, its topline EUV equipment cost 1.2 billion RMB a piece (~$180 million USD). Also, Taiwan made up 47% of its revenue (up 26%), mainly generated by TSMC, while South Korea’s portion decreased from 38% to 26%, quarter over quarter. More crucially, ASML’s EUV equipment appears to be off limits to Mainland China purchasers due to US sanctions. However, it can still sell its less-advanced DUV equipment to China. What’s the difference? DUV can only make chips as small as 25nm, while EUV is capable of making chips smaller than 10nm.
“MiniSo successfully went public in the US, opening day up over 23%! The world's largest private label retailer” (Chinese Source: iponews)
My thoughts:this new IPO by yet another Chinese tech company on the NYSE continues to challenge the narrative of “delisting”. I don’t know much about MiniSo, other than that it’s an e-commerce marketplace targeted at selling small, private brands. The larger story is perhaps Wall Street’s role in the ongoing US-China tension. It already lost the marquee listing of Ant Group, who chose to do a dual-listing in Hong Kong and Shanghai instead. Regardless of how much Washington hates Chinese companies, New York bankers will continue to fight for the huge business of taking companies public -- many of which will come from China.
If you like what you've read, please SUBSCRIBE to the Interconnected email list. To read all previous posts, please check out the Archive section. New content will be delivered to your inbox (twice per week). Follow and interact with me on: Twitter, LinkedIn.
本期《每周互联》总结概括的时间段是:2020年10月12至18日,包括本作者挑选的六条新闻:三条原文是英文,三条原文是中文。声明:所有翻译的文章标题都是我做的翻译,不是官方翻译。
还希望大家有空看看我上周最新的深度分析文章:《中国的云市场天花板》
“参议院委员会想就《纽约邮报》的报道传唤科技公司CEO”(英文来源: Protocol)
我的想法:纽约邮报关于亨特·拜登(副总统拜登的儿子)的报道在Facebook和Twitter上被“处理”的戏剧性事件是上周的大新闻。我不会反刍发生的事情;如果您需要了解整个事件的来龙去脉,互联网上有更好的信息来源。我分享这条即将由三位共和党参议员(Rubio、Graham、Hawley)带领的参议院听证、传呼Zuckerberg和Dorsey的新闻,是因为这个听证的影响深远,甚至比前一阵子以Bezos、Cook、Pichai和(再次)小扎为主角的反垄断听证更重要。虽然反垄断管制的是科技对经济的影响,但是管制科技公司在调节个人言论、表达和信息的适当角色,对文化、民主以及整个社会应该如何运作有着深远的影响。毋庸置疑,让大多数社交媒体公司安全地庇护自己的Communications Decency Act第230条需要更新。然而,更大的问题是如何更新。正如我几个月前在《算法才是问题,扎克伯格不是》一文中所说的:
"当我们把愤怒、懊恼和责怪的矛头指向这些CEO时,那些为他们的社交网络提供燃料的算法——充斥着写它的人们自己的意图、情感和偏见而设计的功能——已经变得过于强大,远远超出了他们的控制。而这些算法是不公开的,不透明的,很难解释,因此我们也更难责怪它。"
任何更新的监管体制都必须把握内容推荐和内容调节的算法本质。
“这款2020年的苹果iPhone也许会在印度组装”(英文来源: Times of India)
我的想法: iPhone 12的亮相是上周的另一个重大科技新闻。虽然这类公告的焦点通常集中在新功能上,但这款手机将在哪里生产可能是更有长远意义的故事。围绕与中国制造业 "脱钩 "的话题已经持续一段时间了,疫情也加剧了各种议论和猜测。我最初对这种 "脱钩 "的速度持怀疑态度,尤其是苹果,我在《离开中国供应链是天方夜谭吗?》一文中发表了这个观点。现在看来,似乎苹果的所有主要制造商 -- 富士康、纬创 -- 都开始在印度投入建厂,以把组装iPhone越来越多的部分放在印度。值得一提的是,苹果想把供应链的地域更多元化已经有几年了。纬创从2017年开始就在印度组装低端iPhone。但印度的制造质量还不够好,无法生产最新model;也许情况从当时到现在已经变了。还有一个简单直接的商业需求,就是要卖更多的iPhone。非iPhone智能手机在印度有90%的市场份额,印度还限制销售非国内生产的智能手机,这就是为什么三星和小米的低端智能手机已经在印度建立了生产基地。为了在印度卖更多的iPhone,苹果必须在印度生产更多的iPhone,就这么简单。我们也许不该过度用地缘政治的角度来解释一切。
“华为就出售部分Honor智能手机业务进行谈判”(英文来源: 路透社)
我的想法: 路透社的这一爆料让我有些意外,因为华为的Honor手机是其比较便宜的产品线,利润率较低,但对性能的要求也较低。如果美国的制裁是这次可能出售的原因,我想象的是华为更高端的产品线Mate会是被出售的对象,因为要买到Mate所需的芯片要比Honor难得多。一种可能的解释是:华为正在试图通过整合内部资源和研发重点来保持Mate未来的竞争力。这次销售的领头买家也有点令人惊讶:神州数码,因为它是华为的一个大的产品代理商,并不是竞品,比如像小米或Oppo,尽管它们也处在出售舆论之中。(请继续看下一条关于神州数码的分析。)
“荣耀出售迷局:神州数码参与接盘 代理商和品牌抱团自救?” (中文来源: 腾讯科技)
我的想法: 这篇文章除了对Honor的出售持怀疑态度,将其归结为谣言多于真实之外,还总结了中国科技产品代理商(比如神州数码)的“悠久历史”,来解释为什么有代理商想收购Honor这样的品牌。这些代理商最早是帮助把国外品牌卖进中国的,比如摩托罗拉大哥大。后来,中国的本土品牌在1998年政府颁布了有关加快电信发展的政策后开花结果。在过去的10年里,代理商的重要性一直在下降,其中一个重要原因是小米创新的销售模式,走电商式的玩法,直接面向消费者卖手机。直到今天,代理商领域的元老,在深圳上市的神州数码,正在寻找重塑自己的方式。考虑到华为目前的疲软和二者间现有的紧密业务关系(神州数码还代理华为云),或许售卖和拥有Honor整个品牌也不是那么奇怪的想法了。
“顶级光刻机售价近12亿元!中国企业能随便买的,是另一种” (中文来源: 中国证券报)
我的想法: 荷兰公司ASML是光刻设备的全球领头羊,也是先进半导体制造的关键要素。根据本文对ASML最新财报的分析,其高端的EUV设备卖价是12亿人民币一台(约1.8亿美元)。另外,台湾地区占其营收的47%(同比增长26%),主要来自于台积电,而韩国地区前后季度相比从38%下降到了26%。更为关键的是,由于美国的制裁,ASML的EUV设备似乎不可以卖到中国大陆,但低端的DUV设备可以。区别在哪呢?DUV只能制造小到25nm的芯片,而EUV能制造小于10nm的芯片。
“名创优品成功赴美上市,开盘大涨超23%!全球规模最大的自有品牌综合零售商” (中文来源: 独角兽早知道)
我的想法:又一家中国科技公司在纽交所上市,继续挑战 "退市 "这个说法。我对名创优品了解不多,只知道它是一个以销售小型私人品牌为主的电商,更重要的事是华尔街在中美持续紧张状态中的角色。它已经失去了蚂蚁集团上市的生意,因为蚂蚁集团选择了在香港和上海进行双重上市。无论华盛顿有多讨厌中国公司,纽约的投资银行界都会努力争取带公司上市的这门大生意,而这门生意会有很多来源于中国。
如果您喜欢所读的内容,请用email订阅加入“互联”。要想读以前的文章,请查阅《互联档案》。每周两次,新的文章将会直接送达您的邮箱。请在Twitter、LinkedIn上给个follow,和我交流互动!